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Abstract 
We present a dynamic comparative advantage model in which moderate reductions in trade costs can 
generate sizable increases in trade volumes over time. A fall in trade costs has two effects on the 
volume of trade. First, for given factor endowments, it raises the degree of specialization of countries, 
leading to a larger volume of trade in the short run. Second, it raises the factor price of each country’s 
abundant production factor, leading to diverging paths of relative factor endowments across countries 
and a rising degree of specialization. A simulation exercise shows that a fall in trade costs over time 
produces a non-linear increase in the trade share of output as in the data. Even when elasticities of 
substitution are not particularly high, moderate reductions in trade costs lead to large trade volumes 
over time. We present further empirical evidence in favour of our approach, documenting the link 
between trade liberalization and the cross-country divergence of investment shares.  
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1 Introduction
One of the most remarkable economic phenomena of the last 40 years is the large
increase of the worlds trade volume. International economists tend to agree about
lower import tari¤s being the natural explanation to this fact, since the second half
of the 20th century has been a period of worldwide trade liberalization. Figure 1
illustrates this idea by plotting the time paths of a worlds average import tari¤
and the US GDP share of its trade volume with non-OPEC countries for the period
1960-1997.1 While the former has fallen by almost a 50% (from 0:16 to 0:09), the
latter has almost trebled (from 0:06 to 0:18). Econometric evidence by Baier and
Bergstrand [1] also supports the idea that the reduction of tari¤-rates is by far the
most important contributor to the rise of the trade share in GDP.2
On the theoretical side, however, linking the fall of import tari¤s to the rise of
world trade does not seem to be such a trivial exercise. As Yi [25] points out, any
attempt to explain the growth of the worlds trade volume on the basis of falling
trade barriers with any of the standard trade models available in the literature
(comparative advantage, increasing returns, Armington assumption) is challenged
by the magnitudes of these variables. Generating a three-fold increase in the volume
of trades share in GDP with just a 7 percentage-point fall of the average tari¤ re-
quires unrealistically high elasticities of substitution between goods.3 Besides, the
relationship between import tari¤s and trade volume is far from being linear, as
the standard models would suggest. Figure 2 plots the US trade share in GDP
against the worlds average tari¤. Notice the increase in the volume of trade from
the mid-70s to the early 90s despite the approximately constant tari¤ over the same
period. Alternative explanations to the growth of world trade have not been entirely
successful at accounting for the increasing trade volume. Yi [25], for example, ex-
plains these puzzles on the basis of vertical specialization only occurring after trade
costs have reached a critical value. His model, however, falls short of explaining an
1The worlds average import tari¤ is based on tari¤s (i.e. import duties over imports) from 35
countries, both developed and developing. See Clemens and Williamson [4]. We are grateful to Je¤
Williamson for kindly sharing these data. Data on volumes of trade come from the IMFs DOTS
database.
2New tradetheory links increased similarity of countriesincomes to higher trade shares (see
Helpman [12]), but the empirical evidence in Baier and Bergstrand [1] and Hummels and Levinsohn
[15] does not seem to lend strong support to this view. Bergoeing and Kehoe [2] calibrate a new
trade theory model in the spirit of Helpman and Krugman [13] and Markusen [18], obtaining
mixed results about the ability of the model to match the impressive growth of intra-OECD trade
in the second half of the 20th century.
3Yi [25] calculates that standard trade models need an elasticity of above 10 or 13 for observed
tari¤ reductions to generate an increase of the trade share in GDP proportional to what we see in
the data. Estimated and calibrated elasticities are usually between 2 and 3.
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important share of the growth in the volume of trade.
This paper goes back to comparative advantage to address these issues. We
prot from an obvious yet important consideration that has been ignored so far in
this context, namely that both trade liberalization and the growth of trade have got
a time dimension. We produce a model based on standard models in the areas of
international trade (the Heckscher-Ohlin model) and economic growth (the Ramsey
model). We argue that a large non-linear increase in the volume of trade in the face
of a moderate reduction in trade barriers over time is quite a natural fact once one
allows for a dynamic response on the factor accumulation side, even when elasticities
of substitution are low.
In a nutshell, the argument goes as follows: a fall in trade costs has two e¤ects
on the volume of trade. First, for given relative factor endowments, it raises the
degree of specialization of countries, leading to a larger volume of trade in the short
run. Second, it raises (lowers) the factor price of each countrys abundant (scarce)
production factor, leading to diverging paths of relative factor endowments across
countries and a rising degree of specialization over time. This creates an additional
e¤ect on the future volume of trade that adds to the static and dynamic e¤ects
of future reductions in trade costs. From a qualitative point of view, the observed
sequence of reductions in trade costs over time brings about a non-linear response
of the trade share in GDP. From a quantitative perspective, the dynamic response
of the export share in GDP when we allow for factor accumulation is three times
larger than in the static trade model.
Our arguments are based on the idea that comparative advantage, and therefore
international trade, is driven to a certain extent by cross-country di¤erences in
relative factor endowments. In this respect, a recent stream of empirical research
has highlighted the relevance of factor endowments for trade, even between rich
countries.4 At the same time, this does not rule out other reasons for trade, such
as technological di¤erences, increasing returns, or vertical specialization. In fact,
any of these elements could be combined with our stylized Heckscher-Ohlin model
to provide a more realistic view of international trade.5
In our framework, the dynamics generated by trade integration has a number of
4See, among other references, Davis and Weinstein [7], [8], [9], Romalis [20], and Schott [22].
Notably, Davis and Weinstein [8] show that, against popular belief, factor endowments are quite
important for North-North trade. They suggest that, for the median country in their ten-country
OECD sample, between one third and one half of its factor trade is with other countries in the
same sample.
5Romalis [20], for example, combines Heckscher-Ohlin and new tradefeatures in a model with
transport costs. In fact, the static trade part of our model can be understood as a particular case
of his. Yi [25] thinks of vertical specialization as the outcome of Ricardian features, but these may
be substituted or complemented by Heckscher-Ohlin features as well.
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empirical implications. The large non-linear increase in the trade volume is probably
the most striking one. However, our model has another strong implication: the
investment shares in income should diverge across countries after episodes of trade
liberalization. We test this prediction using comparable international data, and
show that the average tari¤ clearly Granger-causes the ratio between a rest of the
worldaggregated investment share and its U.S. counterpart. Furthermore, we show
that the contemporaneous and lagged tari¤s have a positive and highly signicant
e¤ect on this investment-share ratio, as predicted by the theory.
A sketch of the Heckscher-Ohlin model with many goods and trade costs that
we use can be found in Mundell [19]; Dornbusch et al. [11] provide an elegant
formalization of the continuum of goods; Romalis [20] introduces trade costs into
the model. There is a vast number of dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models in the
literature, starting with Stiglitz [23]. Some recent references comparing neoclassical
growth under autarky and free trade are Ventura [24] and Cuñat and Ma¤ezzoli [6].
In comparison with these models, we depart from the rather unrealistic autarky/free
trade dichotomy by introducing a trade cost that can change over time. This key
feature enables us to uncover some new insights on the e¤ects of trade integration
when the latter takes place over a long time span.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our analytical
setup, which is used in Section 3 to analyze the link between trade integration and
relative factor endowment divergence. Section 4 discusses the e¤ects of the fall of
trade costs over time on the export share in GDP. Section 5 presents some empirical
evidence on the link between trade integration and the dynamics of physical capital
accumulation. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
This section presents the dynamic trade model we use for studying the long-run
e¤ects of trade integration and technical change. The dynamic component is a
standard Ramsey model, into which we integrate a Heckscher-Ohlin comparative
advantage framework.
2.1 Consumption and Capital Accumulation
Assume the world has two countries, Home and Foreign, denoted by j = H;F . Each
country is populated by a continuum of identical and innitely lived households, each
of measure zero, that can be aggregated into a single country-level representative
household. There are two internationally immobile factors, capital K and labor L.
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For simplicity, we assume that the labor endowment does not respond to changes
in factor prices. Each country produces a nontraded nal good, which is used for
both consumption C and investment I. The representative householdspreferences
over consumption streams can be summarized by the following intertemporal utility
function:6
Ujt =
1X
s=t
s t ln (Cjs) ; (1)
where  is the subjective intertemporal discount factor. The representative house-
holds maximize equation (1) subject to the intratemporal budget constraint
Pjt (Cjt + Ijt) = wjtLjt + rjtKjt; (2)
where Pj is the price of the nal good. Factor prices are taken as given by the
representative household. The capital stocks evolve according to the following ac-
cumulation equation:
Kjt+1 = (1  )Kjt + Ijt: (3)
The rst order conditions
Cjt(rjt=Pjt + 1  ) = Cjt+1; (4)
Kjt+1 = (wjt=Pjt)Lj + (rjt=Pjt + 1  )Kjt   Cjt; (5)
and the usual transversality conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for the represen-
tative households problem. A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy
is characterized by equations (4)-(5) and the equations that characterize the static
trade equilibrium.
2.2 Static Trade Equilibrium
Assume all markets are competitive. The nal good is produced with a continuum
of intermediates z 2 [0; 1], with the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yj =  exp
Z 1
0
lnxj (z) dz

; (6)
where xj (z) denotes the quantity of intermediate good z used in the production of
the nal good Yj in country j, and  is a positive constant.7 Demand for intermediate
6In general, we denote aggregate variables with capital letters.
7 is just used for normalization purposes and plays no major role in the model.
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goods is given by xj (z) =
PjYj
pj(z)
, where Pj is the aggregate price index
Pj = 
 1 exp
Z 1
0
ln pj (z) dz

: (7)
Intermediate goods are produced using capital and labor with the following Cobb-
Douglas technologies:
yj (z) = jkj (z)
z lj (z)
1 z ; (8)
where yj (z) denotes the quantity of intermediate good z produced in country j;
j denotes country-specic factor e¢ ciency levels; and kj (z) and lj (z) denote, re-
spectively, the capital and labor allocated to the production of intermediate good z
in country j. Capital-labor intensities are increasing in z. Technologies are identi-
cal across countries, but for the exogenous factor augmenting coe¢ cients j. The
assumption of unitary elasticities is meant to show how our models dynamic di-
mension can lead to large long-run trade volumes even when we cripplethe static
models ability to do so.8
In contrast with the nal good, intermediate goods can be traded. Trade in
intermediates, however, is assumed not to be frictionless:  > 1 units of a good
must be shipped from the country of origin for one unit to arrive in the country of
destination. (   1 gives a measure of the trade cost. That is,  = 1 corresponds to
free trade.) This is the classical icebergassumption, due to Samuelson [21]. We
can think of trade costs as both transport costs and barriers to trade. Concerning
the latter interpretation, we abstract from any revenue they might produce. For
simplicity, we assume balanced trade: PjYj = rjKj + wjLj.
Let us assume KH=LH > KF=LF , so that Home (Foreign) has a comparative
advantage in capital-intensive (labor-intensive) goods. In general, the models equi-
librium is characterized by a range of very capital-intensive goods and a range of
very labor-intensive goods produced exclusively by Home and Foreign, respectively;
a range of nontraded goods produced by both countries; and factor prices such that
wH=rH > wF=rF . We choose pF (0) = 1 as the numeraire. Given j, Kj, Lj, and  ,
the unknowns of the model are wj, rj, Pj, and zj. The two cut-o¤ values zH , zF ,
0  zH < zF  1, divide the range [0; 1] in the three ranges mentioned above (see
Figure 3):
1. For z 2 [0; zH), z is produced exclusively by Foreign, and exported to Home.
Therefore pH (z) = pF (z), and pF (z) = 
 1
F Z (z) r
z
Fw
1 z
F , where Z(z) =
8The assumption that each sectors capital share equals its index ( (z) = z) is admittedly
strong, but very helpful to solve the model.
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z z (1  z)z 1. Market clearing implies yH(z) = 0, and pF (z) yF (z) = PHYH+
PFYF .
2. For z 2 [zH ; zF ], z is produced in both Home and Foreign, and nontraded.
Therefore pj (z) = 
 1
j Z (z) r
z
jw
1 z
j . Market clearing implies pj (z) yj(z) =
PjYj.
3. For z 2 (zF ; 1], z is produced exclusively by Home, and exported to Foreign.
Therefore pH (z) = 
 1
H Z (z) r
z
Hw
1 z
H , and pF (z) = pH (z). Market clearing
implies pH(z)yH(z) = PHYH + PFYF , and yF (z) = 0.
We can solve for the unknowns from the denition of Pj and the following system
of equations:9
1. Factor market clearing conditions:Z 1
0
@ 1j Z (z) r
z
jw
1 z
j
@w
yj (z) dz = Lj; (9)Z 1
0
@ 1j Z (z) r
z
jw
1 z
j
@r
yj (z) dz = Kj: (10)
2. Marginal commodity conditions:
 1j Z (zj) r
z
jw
1 z
j = 
 1
 jZ (zj) r
z
 jw
1 z
 j : (11)
Given factor prices, the marginal commodity conditions imply there is a range
of commodities that are not worth shipping from one country to another de-
spite comparative advantage. This is due to the price wedge the trade cost
introduces between countries.
3. Numeraire:
pF (0) = 1 = 
 1
F wF : (12)
The system has no analytical solution, and needs to be solved numerically.10
If (KH=LH) = (KF=LF ) is too smallrelative to  , countries will not trade and
the equilibrium will be like under autarky, with zH = 0 and zF = 1. In this case,
from the factor and good market clearing conditions,
waj
raj
=
Kj
Lj
; (13)
9By Walras Law, one of these conditions is redundant.
10Unlike in Dornbusch et al. [10], there is no easy way to summarize the equilibrium conditions
as the intersection of a few nicely behaved schedules.
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where the index a distinguishes autarky equilibrium prices from trade equilibrium
prices. For the autarky equilibrium to be sustainable, it must be true that at autarky
prices transport costs make it pointless to ship goods across countries. That is, the
marginal commodity conditions implied by equation (11) must not hold for z 2 (0; 1):
 1F r
a
F   1H raH ; (14)
 1H w
a
H   1F waF : (15)
Thus, if (waH=r
a
H) = (w
a
F=r
a
F ) = (KH=LH) = (KF=LF )   2, autarky will take place.
If, on the other hand, (KH=LH) = (KF=LF ) >  2, autarky will not be sustainable
and countries will trade.
2.3 Steady State
When countries trade,
rH=PH
rF=PF
=
H
F

z2H z
2
F+2(zF 1)
zF zH : (16)
It is easy to see that z
2
H z2F+2(zF 1)
zF zH < 0. Thus, for KH=LH > KF=LF and H = F ,
rH=PH < rF=PF . Given the assumption that  and  are equal across countries, the
steady state is characterized by the same interest rate for both of them: rj=Pj =
r=P  1

  1 + . Hence, the model cannot yield a steady state in which countries
trade, if technologies are identical across countries. Since we want to depart from
the autarky-vs-free trade thought experiment, let us impose enough structure so
as to have an initial steady state with some trade. Assume H > F .
11 Then
rH=PH = rF=PF if

z2H z
2
F+2(zF 1)
zF zH =
F
H
: (17)
Thus, provided H > F , we may nd a steady state in which countries trade.
12 The
system of equilibrium equations and the condition rH=PH = rF=PF can be solved
11A large literature on cross-country comparison of TFP levels, summarized in Caselli [3], pro-
vides empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
12Note that we introduce cross-country di¤erences in TFP levels only to guarantee the existence
of international trade in steady state: the actual trade ows are generated by the induced di¤erences
in relative factor endowments. Hence, if TFP levels were equal across countries, trade could
nonetheless emerge during converge towards the steady state. There are other ways to generate
di¤erent steady-state capital-labor ratios. E.g., one can assume that the investment good may have
a di¤erent price relative to the consumption good across countries. In terms of the intratemporal
budget constraint,
Pjt
 
Cjt + jIjt

= wjtLjt + rjtKjt;
where  > 0. Cross-country di¤erences in  may be justied in terms of taxation, institutions, etc.
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numerically for KH , KF , zH , and zF . A similar procedure enables us to solve for the
js that generate a particular steady-state distribution of capital stocks such that
KH=LH > 
2KF=LF . Numerical explorations suggest that both of these procedures
are remarkably robust and generate unique results.
2.4 Solution Procedure
The recursive structure of our problem guarantees that the solution can be repre-
sented as a couple of time-invariant policy functions expressing the optimal level of
consumption in each region as a function of the two state variables, KH and KF .
These policy functions have to satisfy the following functional equations:
Cj (K
0
H ; K
0
F )
 
r0j=P
0
j + 1  

= Cj (KH ; KF ) ; (18)
where K 0j = [(wj=Pj)Lj + (1   + rj=Pj)Kj   Cj (KH ; KF )], and the factor prices
wj=Pj and rj=Pj are obtained by numerically solving the appropriate equilibrium
conditions. The policy functions have to generate stationary time series in order
to satisfy the transversality conditions. To solve equation (18) numerically, we
apply the Orthogonal Collocation projection method described in Judd [16]. The
Appendix describes our computational strategy in detail.
We choose parameter values that yield an initial steady state in which Homes
trade share in GDP and the trade cost approximate, respectively, the US trade share
(0:06) and the world average import tari¤ (1:17). Following Cooley and Prescott [5],
we set  = 0:96 and  = 0:048 - standard values in the quantitative macroeconomics
literature which implicitly assume that the unit time period is a year. We assume
LH + LF = 2. We choose  = 0:15, which implies an autarky steady-state world
capital stock K = 2 when j = 1. We x  0 = 1:17 and numerically solve for the js
that yield a trade share in GDP equal to 0:06 for Home. The resulting coe¢ cients are
H = 1:09 and F = 0:93, which imply KH + KF = 2, and
 
KH=LH

=
 
KF=LF

=
1:84 >  20. (We choose a symmetric situation such that KH = LF and KF = LH .)
3 Trade Integration and Factor Accumulation
To study the e¤ects of a reduction in trade costs, we assume the world is in the
steady state described above, and let  fall to  1 = 1:16 suddenly and permanently.
Figure 4 displays the time paths of real per-capita income, consumption, investment,
and capital for both countries, as percentage deviations from the original steady
state. (The rst ten years correspond to the original steady state.) On impact,
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income per capita increases by 0:03 percentage points at Home and by 0:04 points in
Foreign.13 This e¤ect is due to the static gains from trade integration, which reduces
the price wedge between countries. Countries can now exploit their comparative
advantages better for given factor endowments. That is, both Home and Foreign
nd it optimal to reduce the range of goods they produce and exchange a wider
range of commodities. This enables both of them to consumemore intermediate
goods and thus produce more of the nal good.
The static e¤ect is quite small in comparison with the long-run e¤ect, since the
dynamics leads to a remarkable process of long-run divergence in capital-labor ratios.
To understand the mechanics of the exercise, let us look at the time path of factor
prices in terms of the nal good in Figure 5. Notice that right after the fall in 
interest rates diverge, rising in country H and falling in country F . This raises the
incentive to delay consumption and accumulate capital in country H, whereas the
opposite happens in country F . This is what causes the initial upward (downward)
jump of investment, and the initial downward (upward) jump of consumption in
country H (country F ).14
Why do interest rates react as they do after a fall in ? Home ceases to produce
the most labor-intensive goods it used to produce, since they become cheaper to im-
port from Foreign. This implies capital and labor need to be reallocated from labor-
intensive towards capital-intensive goods. In this case, full employment requires the
use of lower capital-labor intensities, which imply a higher marginal productivity of
capital, and thus a higher rH . A symmetric argument leads to a lower rF . Figure 6
shows that the range of non-traded goods shrinks immediately after the fall in  : zF
falls, i.e. country F ceases to produce its most capital-intensive goods, and zH rises,
i.e. country H stops producing its most labor-intensive goods. Notice that both
countriesshares of trade in income, VH = 2zH and VF = 2 (1  zF ), increase.15
The di¤erent reaction of interest rates implies that investment increases in coun-
try H and decreases in country F . Home (Foreign) raises (reduces) its capital-labor
ratio and drives the interest rate back to its steady-state level over time. This leads
to an increasing di¤erence in their capital-labor ratios, and reinforces their respec-
tive patterns of comparative advantage, reducing the range of nontraded goods even
more, and raising the share of trade in GDP. In fact, the dynamic response of the
13The static e¤ect is so small that it cannot be read o¤ Figure 4.
14The cross-country interest rate di¤erential is actually very small, being no grater than 0:08
percentage points: the presence of moderate transaction costs might be enough to prevent inter-
national capital ows.
15Kehoe and Ruhl [17] show that actual episodes of trade liberalizations increased trade along
both the intensive (more trade in the same goods) and the extensive margins (trade in new goods).
This empirical evidence is in line with our models predictions.
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two countriestrade volumes is much larger than the static one. For example, 50
years after the fall in  , the increase in the trade share is more than double as large
as the short-run (static) increase.
It is worth noting that both countries gain from trade integration in terms of
welfare. A comparison of their utility levels with and without the fall in the trade
cost shows that both countries achieve a higher level of utility in the new scenario.
Although the long-run income per capita level of Foreign falls, the fact that it
can attain a higher level of consumption in the rst periods after the change in 
compensates for the discounted long-run losses in consumption. On the other hand,
Home experiences an initial fall in consumption, but is more than compensated by
the discounted future gains.
Notice that the result on long-run income and consumption divergence depends
on the assumption that one of the two factors is not accumulable. A similar model
with two accumulable factors would predict diverging relative factor endowments
and growing volumes of trade over time, but not necessarily cross-country income
per capita divergence. Trade liberalization would produce an interest rate di¤erential
in favor of each countrys relatively abundant factor. Within each country, therefore,
investment would be reallocated towards the abundant factor, exacerbating cross-
country relative factor endowment di¤erences.
4 A Fall in Trade Costs over Time
Yi [25] argues that the nonlinear growth of the trade share in GDP is hard to explain
by standard trade models on the basis of falling trade barriers, since these have not
decreased that much over the same time period. The discussion in the previous
section suggests that a non-linear increase in the volume of trade in the face of a
protracted reduction in trade barriers is quite a natural fact once one takes into
account the dynamic response on the factor accumulation side. In our model, a fall
in trade costs raises the volume of trade immediately, but also leads to diverging
paths of relative factor endowments through its e¤ect on factor prices. This creates
an additional e¤ect on the future volume of trade, that adds to the static e¤ect of
subsequent reductions in trade costs.
We perform a simulation exercise with our dynamic trade model to illustrate this
argument. We feed the time path of the world average import tari¤ into our model,
and compare the predicted time paths for the Norths trade share in GDP with that
of the US. For this purpose, however, we rst have to decide whether the fall in the
trade cost over time is unexpected or anticipated. This is a matter of relevance,
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given that permanent changes in the trade cost lead to changes in steady states. We
assume that trade liberalization is a decision about the future path of  , which is
made at time 0 and is known by economic agents. The process that determines the
time path of  after trade liberalization is agreed is assumed to be
 t+1 = (1  )  +  t + et+1; (19)
where  denotes the long-run value for  , and e is an error term.16 Given the observed
time path for  , we use nonlinear least squares to estimate  (^ = 0:96) and 
( = 1:08). The model ts remarkably well: all coe¢ cients are highly signicant.17
These estimates and equation (19) enable us to obtain the expected time path
^ . Any di¤erences between the expected and observed time paths are treated as
unexpected changes in the trade cost.
We assume that the world is in the steady state associated with  0 = 1:17 and 
KH=LH

=
 
KF=LF

= 1:84, which implies a trade share in GDP equal to 0:06 for
Home, and that at time 0 a trade liberalization agreement is reached, whereby the
future time path of  is determined according to equation (19). Figure 7 plots the
actual (solid line) and predicted (dotted line) time paths of the US trade share in
GDP. Our simulation approximates the actual time path for the US trade share very
accurately. The predicted export share rises over time due to both the change in
the long-run value  and to the variation in  t. The fall in  implies a change in
the steady states of countries, and therefore triggers a process of long-run relative
factor endowment divergence. The successive reductions in  t cause a sequence
of increases in the trade share (through both the static and dynamic mechanisms
discussed in the previous section) that build upon the e¤ect generated by the change
in steady states. Notice that during the period 1975-1990, the volume of trade rises
in spite of  being roughly constant. This is due to the divergence in relative factor
endowments triggered by the liberalization process.
To show the extent to which the trade share in GDP is responding to the dynam-
ics triggered by trade integration, Figure 7 also reports the predicted trade share in
GDP when we keep factor endowments constant at their initial levels (dotted line).
16A gradual fall in  seems to correspond to historical experience better. Governments tend to
liberalize slowly over time, due probably to political reasons.
17The p-values for the standard t-tests, calculated using the Newey-West HAC estimator of the
residualsvariance-covariance matrix, are almost zero. The adjusted R2 is 0:88. The Jarque-Brera
test generates a p-value equal to 0:11: the null hypothesis of normal distributed residuals cannot
be rejected. Furthermore, the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test (two lags included)
generates a p-value equal to 0:58 so that also the null hypothesis of serial uncorrelation cannot
be rejected. Finally, the White F -test for heteroschedasticity (cross terms included) generates a
p-value equal to 0:45: also the null hypothesis of homoschedasticity cannot be rejected.
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In this case, the response of the trade share to the fall in the trade cost is much
weaker: the trade share in GDP rises by 0:04, whereas in the factor accumulation
case it rises by almost three times as much. Figure 7 also reports the trade share
predicted by the dynamic model under the assumption that the whole time path of
 is unexpected (dash-dotted line), i.e. when  = 1 in equation (19). Its qualitative
behavior is quite similar to that obtained under ^ = 0:96. The predicted time path
of the export share generated with  = 1 also displays an increasing trend. The
mechanism here is less powerful than above, given that the reduction in  is not
anticipated by agents. However, the cumulative e¤ect of the successive reductions
in  t still applies.
Figure 8 revisits the relationship between the import tari¤ and the trade vol-
ume we explored in Figure 2, which we copy in the top-left panel of 8. The other
three panels plot the results of our three simulations. Notice that the static model
(bottom-right panel) displays a linear relationship between the import tari¤ and the
trade share. Our dynamic model reproduces instead the non-linearity observed in
the data. Again, the simulation under the assumption that the whole time path
of the import tari¤ is known from the very beginning (top-right panel) produces
a larger response than the simulation in which agents are assumed to learn slowly
about the time path of the tari¤ (bottom-left panel).
5 Some Empirical Evidence
The large non-linear increase in the trade volume described above is our models
most striking implication, and seems quite in line with the data. However, a careful
examination of the impulse response functions reported in Figure 4 suggests that
our model has another strong implication: the investment shares in income should
diverge after episodes of trade liberalization. In particular, the investment share
should increase in the capital-abundant country and decrease in the labor-abundant
one.
Since comparable international data for GDP and its components are easily
available, this prediction can be tested. We take advantage of the Penn World
Tables Mark 6.1,18 and collect data on real investment and GDP for a large set of
countries (105 developed and developing countries, i.e. all countries whose sample
starts in 1960) over the 1960-97 time horizon. In the spirit of our two-country
model, we aggregate all countries but for the U.S. into a rest of the worldentity,
18See Heston, Summers and Aten [14]. We construct series for real investment and real GDP (in
constant prices) using the variables RGDPL (real GDP per capita at constant prices, Laspeyres
index), KI (investment share of RGDPL), and POP (population).
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p-values (Wald stat.)
Lags included: 1 2 3 4
RRoW 9 CW 0.91 0.97 0.80 0.75
CW 9 RRoW 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
d (RRoW )9 d (CW ) 0.87 0.67 0.67 0.59
d (CW )9 d (RRoW ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Table 1: Granger causality: investment-share ratio vs. tari¤
and calculate its aggregate investment share as total investment over total GDP.19
Finally, we calculate the ratio of this aggregate investment share over the investment
share of the U.S. computed similarly. Formally:
RRoW 
 PN
j=1 IjPN
j=1 Yj
!
=

IUS
YUS

(20)
Our model predicts that decreases in the trade cost have a negative and persistent
e¤ect on the investment-share ratio, since the numerator decreases and the denom-
inator increases. That is, the average tari¤ and the investment-share ratio should
be positively correlated. Table 1 reports the p-values for a set of pairwise Granger
causality Wald tests performed by running a VAR on the investment-share ratio
RRoW and the Clemens-Williamson average world tari¤ CW : the results suggest
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the investment-share ratio not Granger
causing the tari¤, while the null hypothesis of the tari¤ not Granger causing the
investment-share ratio can be rejected at high condence levels. The result holds
for a wide range of lags included, and remains valid if we switch to rst di¤erences.
These results support the view that the average tari¤ helps forecast the current and
future values of the investment-share ratio.
The previous analysis suggests that there exists a relationship between invest-
ment rates and tari¤s, but does not clarify the actual sign of this relationship.
To address this issue, we compute the impulse response functions of the endogenous
variable, the investment-share ratio, when the exogenous variable, the average tari¤,
is hit by a shock. Figure 9 shows the impulse response of RRoW after a one stan-
dard deviation shock to CW under an orthogonal Cholesky identication scheme
in which the CW is placed rst in the variablesordering. In other words, it plots
the response of the investment-share ratio to a positive shock to the average tari¤,
under the assumption that shocks to the average tari¤ contemporaneously a¤ect the
latter only. As we can see, a positive shock to the average tari¤ has a signicantly
positive e¤ect on the investment-share ratio.
19Similar result are obtained if the cross-country average investment share is used.
13
Dependent variable: RRoW
Lags of CW
c AR(1) 0  1  2  3  4 R2 LM WH
Value 0.58 - 4.56 - - - - 0.45 - -
p-value 0.00 - 0.00 - - - - - 0.00 0.16
Value 0.85 0.75 2.38 - - - - 0.69 - -
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.07 - - - - - 0.45 0.60
Value 1.30 0.90 - -2.08 - - - 0.68 - -
p-value 0.00 0.00 - 0.42 - - - - 0.63 0.99
Value 0.63 0.61 - - 4.02 - - 0.69 - -
p-value 0.00 0.00 - - 0.00 - - - 0.42 0.62
Value 0.36 0.42 - - - 5.98 - 0.74 - -
p-value 0.00 0.00 - - - 0.00 - - 0.50 0.42
Value 0.26 0.24 - - - - 6.64 0.73 - -
p-value 0.05 0.07 - - - - 0.00 - 0.20 0.30
Table 2: Regressions
Another natural step forward is to regress the investment-share ratio on a con-
stant and the average tari¤: Table 2 reports the results for this and some other
experiments.20 The coe¢ cient on the contemporaneous tari¤ is positive and signi-
cant,21 and the adjusted R2 is quite high. However, the usual tests on the residuals
(the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation Test, LM, and the White Heteroskedastic-
ity Test, WH) suggest that the residuals are not iid, and in particular that they are
plagued with a strong autocorrelation.
To take this into account, we add an autoregressive component to the regression:
this e¤ectively solves the autocorrelation in the residuals problem, and increases the
explanatory power of the regression, as measured by the adjusted R2. Note that the
coe¢ cient on the average tari¤ remains positive and signicant at the 10% level.
Including an autoregressive component in the regression has also a straightforward
economic interpretation: if some of the countries in the sample are actually not in
steady state at the beginning of the sample period, we should expect an adjustment
process due to the standard neoclassical conditional convergence argument, that
drives the investment-share ratio down to its long-run value. This long-run adjust-
ment process would be captured by the autoregressive component in our regression.
The model predicts that the e¤ect of a reduction in the trade cost should persist
over time: Table 2 reports the results for regressions that include various lags of the
20Note that theoretical considerations rule out the possibility that our variables are integrated
or trend stationary. We expect both the average tari¤ and the investment-share ratio to converge
to a constant value in the long run.
21The p-values for all standard tests are constructed using the Newey-West Heteroskedasticity
and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) estimator for the residualscovariance matrix.
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average tari¤. With the only exception of the rst lag, all coe¢ cients are positive
and highly signicant, and their size increases with the lag itself.
6 Concluding Remarks
The standard static trade model cannot produce a large e¤ect of trade liberaliza-
tion on the volume of trade without unrealistically high elasticities of substitution.
However, a dynamic version of the same model (with unitary elasticities) is enough
to achieve this goal. Our model is very stylized in a number of ways (just two
countries, only one accumulable factor, no technical di¤erences across countries, no
technical progress, no intra-industry trade,...), and encourages extensions in sev-
eral directions to better understand the growth of world trade and the dynamics of
particular countries.
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7 Appendix
Following Judd [16], we approximate the policy functions for consumption over a
rectangle D  [k; k]  [k; k] 2 R2+ with a linear combination of multidimensional
orthogonal basis functions taken from a 2 -fold tensor product of Chebyshev polyno-
mials. In other words, we approximate the policy function for country j 2 fH;Fg
with:
bcj (KH ; KF ; aj) = dX
z=0
dX
q=0
ajzq zq (KH ; KF ) (21)
where:
 zq (KH ; KF )  Tz

2
KH   k
k   k   1

Tq

2
KF   k
k   k   1

(22)
and fKH ; KFg 2 D. Each Tn represents an n-order Chebyshev polynomial, dened
over [ 1; 1] as Tn (x) = cos (n arccos x), while d denotes the higher polynomial order
used in our approximation. In our case, it turns out that d = 4 is a good compromise
between speed and accuracy.
We dened the residual functions as:
Rj (kH ; kF ; aj)  c^j (kH ; kF ; aj)
 
r0j=P
0
j + 1  
  c^j (k0H ; k0F ; aj) (23)
where k0j = wj=Pj + (1   + rj=Pj) kj   c^j (kH ; kF ; aj); the factor prices in terms of
the nal goods are determined by numerically solving the appropriate equilibrium
conditions.
To pin down the vectors aj we use the simplest projection method: orthogonal
collocation. This method identies the 2m2 coe¢ cients, wherem = d+1, by making
the approximating polynomials exactly solve the functional equations (23) at some
m2 distinct points in D, known as collocation nodes. In other words, the functional
equations are transformed into a system of 2m2 non-linear equations:
Rj (kzH ; kqF ; aj) = 0; z; q = 1; 2; :::; d+ 1 (24)
that can be solved with any robust numerical solver.22 To minimize the approxima-
tion error, we optimally chose the collocation nodes among the zeros of Chebyshev
polynomials: given the m zeros of Tm

2 (x  k) =  k   k  1 in k; k, we organize
them into two (identical) vectors fkH;igmi=1and fkF;igmi=1 and take their Cartesian
product fkH;ig  fkF;ig as the set of our collocation nodes.
Table 3 summarizes the empirical distribution of the Euler equation residuals in
22We use Broydens variant of the standard Newton method and follow a continuation approach
to obtain the initial conditions.
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Home Foreign
Avg: 4.40e-11 1.77e-10
Med: 4.56e-11 2.07e-10
Std: 4.80e-11 1.96e-10
Max: 8.74e-11 3.07e-10
Table 3: Euler equation residuals
absolute terms, i.e. the values of jRj (kH ; kF ; aj)j, over 100 equally spaced points in
D that do obviously not coincide with the collocation nodes. As we can see, the size
of the residuals is extremely small, and this conrms that orthogonal collocation is
not only simple but also surprisingly e¢ cient and accurate. The functional equation
residuals are of course only an indirect measure of the quality of our approximation,
but still a very informative one. Another informative test of the approximation
accuracy is the long-run stability of the solution: the approximated system remains
in steady state even if the simulation horizon is extended to 10; 000 years.
Once the approximated policy functions are available, we choose the initial con-
ditions and simulate the system recursively to generate the articial time series for
all variables of interest by using the appropriate set of policy functions.
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Figure 1: Average import tari¤and US GDP share of volume of trade. (Time paths)
Figure 2: Average import tari¤ and US GDP share of volume of trade.
20
Figure 3: Equilibrium trade pattern
Figure 4: Income, consumption, investment, and capital.
21
Figure 5: Factor prices (deviations and di¤erentials).
Figure 6: Trade shares and specialization (levels and deviations).
22
Figure 7: Trade integration and the US trade share. (1)
Figure 8: Trade integration and the US trade share. (2)
23
Figure 9: VAR(1) impulse response function (Cholesky identication scheme)
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